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THE MANNER OF GOVERNMENT SPEECH
RANDALL P. BEZANSONt
INTRODUCTION
The government speech doctrine began inauspiciously in Rust v.
Sullivan in 1991.' It has grown metastatically since that time. It is now a
largely uncontroversial rule that when the government is speaking, its
expressive actions are immune from First Amendment freedom of speech
limits. Beneath the smooth and judicially-comforting surface of this rule,
however, lie many difficult problems. The problem I address is the
"manner" of the government's speech-what forms of speech should
count as government speech, and what forms should not.
In addressing this question, I will make two points at the outset.
First, the government speech doctrine is mis-named. It is not just immu-
nity for the government's act of speaking, but also for the government's
exclusion of unwelcomed speech in the time, place, and space of gov-
ernment speech activity. The doctrine, in short, is really a government
speech forum doctrine. 2 My second point is that because the government
speech doctrine reserves a forum in which the government possesses a
monopoly on the ability to speak-a right to exclude all other speech it
doesn't want or like-we must be concerned about the way the govern-
ment conducts itself expressively-the manner of its speech-in its new
forum.
I. THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH FORUM
How is it that we have gotten to this point? Let me begin with a
brief history of the government speech forum doctrine. Its beginnings
emerged from the public forum doctrine. Public forums are classified in
three types.3 First is the open public forum: public space where private
speech of the uninhibited, robust quality is allowed. Examples include
streets, sidewalks, and parks. Second, there are designated public forums,
which are times, places, and spaces whose public function justifies a
limitation on the types of individual speech activity taking place there-
for example, schools and concerts. In a designated public forum the gov-
t David H. Vernon Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law.
I. See 500 U.S. 173, 193-94 (1991) (holding that the government can script a doctor's
discussion with a patient on the subject of abortion when the doctor is an agent of the government in
a federally funded clinic).
2. See Randall P. Bezanson, The Government Speech Forum: Forbes and Finley and Gov-
ernment Speech Selection Judgments, 83 IOWA L. REV. 953 passim (1998).
3. In the interest of simplicity I refer the reader to the wonderful discussion and analysis of
the public forum categories and criteria by Erwin Chemerinsky in his treatise, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1127-1144 (3d ed. 2006).
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ernment can restrict the forms and even the subjects of individual speech
by means reasonably adapted to the function of the forum (time, space,
or place), but the government cannot restrict speech solely because of its
point of view. Finally, the third kind of forum is the non-public forum, a
space reserved by the government where no individual free speech is to
take place-an opera in a public hall, a museum, or a Presidential press
conference, for example. In this forum, the government can prohibit free
speech by non-government speakers, but it cannot selectively permit
some individual speech but not other speech because of the speech's
point of view. In other words, the government cannot close off a time or
place or space from individual speech and then open it up solely for a
viewpoint the government favors.4
The three-part government forum doctrine worked well for many
years, but in due course it ran into a few problems-namely, the gov-
ernment's felt need to selectively admit certain points of view into its
forum and not others. Consider a doctor's advice to a patient at a family
planning clinic supported by government funds, where the doctor is an
agent of the government and thus subject to the government's/clinic's
policy against abortion. 5 Can the non-public forum principle do the work
necessary to justify excluding abortion advice? Probably not, under the
no-point-of-view-discrimination rule. How about a government-owned
flag whose desecration is prohibited? 6 Or government arts funding deci-
sions based on artistic quality or even consistency with traditional Amer-
ican values and decency?
7
The government speech doctrine grew out of these kinds of cases
because the Supreme Court found itself unable to squeeze the right result
out of the public forum categories. It began with the rather benign idea
that of course the government can speak to its public, its democratic rul-
ers. Indeed, the government must speak, and propose, and defend, and
inform in order for democracy to work.8 But the situations in which the
cases arose were never benign, though the danger was never apparent to
the Court-even to this day, I think. Of course the government can
speak. But the government speech claims were of a different ilk: to be
the only speaker to the patient in the family planning clinic;9 to be the
editor of the public television station;10 to deny government funding to
all indecent art, even where the government is the only funder in an ex-
4. Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86
IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1404-05 (2001).
5. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193-94, 198.
6. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989).
7. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 572 (1998). See RANDALL P.
BEZANSON, ART AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 7-49 (2009), for a discussion of the Finley case.
8. Bezanson & Buss, supra note 4, at 1380; see Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good,
53 VAND. L. REV. I, 8-11 (2000).
9. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193-94.
10. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673-74 (1998).
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hibition or performance, or owns an art museum at which only decent art
will be shown;" to be the principal advertiser of beef, even if not in the
government's own name;' 2 to express through monuments or through
government web sites' 3 the government's religious, ideological, or even
political preferences, and none other; to assume control, and authorship,
of employee speech in the workplace;' 4 to endorse Christianity with a
cross in the Mohave Desert, not just for a minute, but for as long as gov-
ernment likes, and without a symbol to the contrary allowed.' 5
The government speech doctrine began, and it has survived, as
something other than its name implies. The doctrine does not protect the
government's ability to speak. Instead, it grants the government a forum
for its expression that can span time, place, and space, and in which only
ideas it favors may be spoken, and other ideas with which the govern-
ment would ordinarily have to compete may be excluded. 16 I do not
doubt the government's need for such forums for the conduct of execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial business, and indeed for other operational
purposes, 17 such as a military commander giving troops a motivational
talk before going into battle. And I do not doubt the need for the gov-
ernment's right to exclude other and contrary speech in its forum no mat-
ter what the subject of its speech. Every day that I teach, I benefit from
the right to exclude certain speech in my government classroom.
But when the forum protects government speech on public matters
to its publics in a society committed to individual freedom of speech and
democratic self-government, we should recognize that the government's
exclusive forum is potentially very dangerous. Frankly, its dangers are
not much blunted by the limits on government speech that I and others
have previously proposed, such as no government monopoly power over
an idea;' 8 no ventriloquism;' 9 and transparency about government au-
thorship. 20 These may help limit the government's forum power, but they
do not limit the ways in which the government is free to couch its expres-
1I. Finley, 524 U.S. at 574-75, 587-88.
12. Johanns v Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 560-63 (2005).
13. See, e.g., Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 329-31 (lst Cir. 2009).
14. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 436-38 (2006); see Helen Norton, Constraining Pub-
lic Employee Speech: Government's Control of Its Workers' Speech to Protect Its Own Expression,
59 DUKE L.J. 1, 11-13 (2009).
15. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 772 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom.
Salazar v. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009) (awaiting decision).
16. Of course the government itself, through its agents or otherwise, need not speak in the
forum; instead, the government may express its views through selected private speech. See Finley,
524 U.S. at 587-88; Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998).
17. Government websites limited to government information and government policy views
are an example. See, e.g., Sutliffe, 584 F.3d at 329-35.
18. Bezanson & Buss, supra note 4, at 1488-90, 1510-11; Greene, supra note 8, at 27-29.
19. Greene, supra note 8, at 49-52; Abner S. Greene, (Mis)Attribution, 87 DENV. U. L. REV.
833, 844 (2010); see also Bezanson & Buss, supra note 4, at 1457-63, 1467.
20. Helen Norton & Danielle Keats Citron, Government Speech 2.0, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 899
(2010).
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sion and the objects on which it may speak publicly in its forum-the
manner of government speech, as I call it.
II. THE MANNER OF GOVERNMENT SPEECH
Armed with this more full-bodied idea of a government speech fo-
rum-a place, time, or space where competing views are not allowed-
how should we think about the manner of speech that enjoys the luxury
of the government's forum? My concerns here are twofold.
My first concern is what the government says in its forum. The gov-
ernment's speech activity should be limited by the specific purposes its
speech serves under the Constitution. In the government's capacity as a
speaker, just as in its capacity as a regulator, the work of the First
Amendment is to limit government, not free it.2 1 As my colleague Bill
Buss and I have written, to consider the government as a First Amend-
ment rights-holder would be "deeply inconsistent with individual free-
dom and with constitutional notions of democratic self-government. 2
My second concern is how government says what it says. That is,
the government should be restricted in the expressive ways it carries out
its constitutional responsibilities.
[W]hen the means government employs to speak its message inter-
fere with private speech or distort the private marketplace of speech,
those means should be closely scrutinized in the interest of protecting
the fundamental constitutional purpose of preserving 'an independent
realm of speech within which public opinion is understood to be
forged.'
23
I begin, briefly, with the first concern, the "what." Government
speaking is essential to accomplishing the democratic goals of individual
freedom and self-government. It is necessary that the government speak
publicly in order to inform, explain, educate, and even attempt to per-
suade, clearly, transparently, intentionally, and understandably. Without
this, Alexander Meiklejohn famously declared, the polity cannot engage
in the business of government, evaluate government policy, or disagree
and dissent.
24
In many ways free speech law has outgrown Mr. Meiklejohn.
Whether that is good or bad is a matter for another day. But Meiklejohn's
conception of the range and rules of free speech seem, on reflection, par-
ticularly apt for the government when it speaks in its own forum. "The
21. Bezanson & Buss, supra note 4, at 1501-08.
22. Id. at 1508.
23. Id. at 1508-09 (quoting Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 151
(1996)).
24. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
26-27 (1948).
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principle of the freedom of speech.., is not a Law of Nature or of Rea-
son in the abstract. It is a deduction from the basic American agreement
that public issues shall be decided by universal suffrage." 25 This, in turn,
"requires that so far as time allows, all facts and interests relevant to the
problem shall be fully and fairly presented . .. [so] that all the alternative
lines of action can be wisely measured in relation to one another." 26 Fur-
ther, "Ulust so far as, at any point, the citizens who are to decide an issue
are denied acquaintance with information or opinion .. .which is rele-
vant to that issue, just so far the result must be ill-considered."2 7 "The
First Amendment, then, is not the guardian of unregulated talkative-
ness."28 In its own constitutionally favored forum, the government's
speech should be governed by the duty to fully inform, and it should be
limited by the requirement that the informing be reasoned and fair.
What the government says may often turn on how it says it. This is
my second concern. The business of government in a democracy is not
faith, or force, or unrestrained emotion, or deception. It is instead reason
and disagreement and compromise and discourse on matters falling with-
in the realm of government authority. The government's speech in its
forum should thus be transparent in its origins, clear in its meaning, and
capable of reasoned, cognitive understanding. These are the govern-
ment's expressive stock in trade in a democracy in which people rule and
in which passion and prejudice are best blunted by the reasoned ex-
change of ideas and information.
Means of communication that appeal only to the senses and pas-
sions short circuit the dialectic with the declarative, reason with force.
Individuals are free under the First Amendment to engage in such forms
of expression. 29 Government, too, may usually have the power to do so,
since the content and even the style of the government's public commu-
nications are, as a general matter, left to the political branches.
30
But with the government speech doctrine we are dealing with a fo-
rum for government speaking that permits the government to exclude all
others-that is, all private speakers and all opposing viewpoints-from
the forum the government has created for the communication of its own
viewpoints: the doctor advising a patient about a choice the government
dislikes (abortion); the grant officer declining to support art and artists
that the government finds offensive; the tenets of belief in a religion that
not all people share and upon which many people, but not the govern-
25. Id.
26. Id. at 25.
27. Id. at 26.
28. Id. at 25.
29. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971).
30. Many controls of this sort have been enacted through the political process. See Lyrissa
Barnett Lidsky, Nobody's Fools: The Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L.
REV. 799, 845 (2010).
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ment, find offensive;3 1 a web site reserved for expressing the govern-
ment's political preferences and views. 32 In a democracy, the government
can surely arrive at the policies embodied in each of these (and many
other) instances of government action through expression. But when the
government's action is expressive, the effect of giving the government
the power to exclude other views from its speech forum is that the com-
petition in ideas is blunted and the views of individuals are muted in a
society in which individuals alone have the freedom of speech.
In this limited setting the government possesses the constitutional
power of the censor. This is why the government's power of expression
in its forum should be held to the very limits that justify its right to ex-
press: reason, not force; explanation, not declaration; cognition, not pas-
sion. The government serves the people. In a democratic order it owes
them an explanation and justification, if for no other reason than without
those things individuals are unable to dissent and disagree in the forums
available to them for free speech.
What does this principle of openness and reason mean, especially at
a time when technology is opening up new ways in which the govern-
ment can employ its expressive power?33 How does reason fit into the
new visual, immediate, image-laden forms of expression? My answer is
that in its forum the government should not be able, free of counter-
speech, to speak publicly on public matters in exclusively aesthetic and
emotional ways. To place a monument with the Ten Commandments
before the courthouse is a declaration-of faith and belief-and not an
argument or reasoned expression. It's not a teachable moment in which
the values of the commandments are explained. The monument in that
place doesn't invite discussion. It simply "is." The same can be said
about a very large cross placed on a promontory in a national park-
even, I would say, if the government sold the tiny parcel on which it sits
to the private group that originally sponsored it.34 Government can speak
through selling land as easily as it can speak through scripting a private
doctor.35
This is, in fact, far from a radical idea. The working definition of
speech for purposes of the First Amendment has always been a linear
one.36 As Justice Harlan put it in the setting of expressive conduct, free
31. E.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1129-30, 1138 (2009).
32. See, e.g., Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 334-35 (1 st Cir. 2009).
33. Norton & Citron, supra note 20.
34. Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom Salazar
v. Buono, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009) (challenging a large cross on a small piece of land atop an other-
wise isolated promontory in the
national park in the Mojave Desert).
35. See id.; Joseph Blocher, Property and Speech in Summum, 104 Nw. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 83, 90 (2009), http://www.law.northwestern.edullawreview/colloquy/2009/3 I/
LRColI2009n31 Blocher.pdf.
36. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18-22 (1971).
[Vol. 87:4
THE MANNER OF GOVERNMENT SPEECH
speech presumes a speaker intending to send a message to an audience
that reasonably understands the message.37 This is a useful linear model
of communication, narrower than it need always be, but appropriate for
the public speaking activities of the government in its exclusionary fo-
rum. It closely fits the ideal of purposeful, cognitive, and rational dis-
course in which the government should be engaged when informing,
explaining, and persuading in the open marketplace of political debate
and discussion. 38 In its own forum it is appropriate to insist that the gov-
ernment have a message that it intends to communicate to an audience
that will reasonably understand that message, if for no other reason than
that people will thus be able to understand what government is saying
and agree or disagree with it in other available forums.
The aesthetic quality of speech can of course be useful and should
not be categorically limited in the hands of government. But aesthetics
can also be dangerous, for aesthetic expression is capable-indeed, per-
haps uniquely capable--of disrupting the linear and cognitive model.
This is because much aesthetic expression-just like much art, or adver-
tising-appeals dominantly to the sensual and emotional response of an
audience in a process that disengages the text or object communicated
from the audience's sensual act of interpretation and imagination. 39 As
Karol Berger puts it, aesthetic expression has the "ability to evoke imagi-
nary worlds, and not representation in the strict and narrow sense.'
'4
[I]n an act of cognition whereby we get to know an object, the...
powers of imagination .. .and understanding ... are engaged like
two gear wheels. But in an act of aesthetic contemplation, the two
wheels spin without engaging and the cognitive mechanism runs on
idle .... 41
Thus representations of soup cans can be made to mean quite differ-
ent and various things to those who see them presented in a certain way,
place, or at a certain time. Likewise a perfectly cognitive and logical
statement can, by aesthetic additions or amplifications, be made to carry
a very different and sometimes inconsistent meaning to readers or view-
ers, as, for example, the carefully insinuated message of race in the infa-
mous political ad featuring Willy Horton.42 Lawrence Lessig describes
37. See id. at 21.
38. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 24, at 24-27.
39. "Aesthetic" is defined as: "Of or pertaining to sensuous perception, received by the
senses." OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). For an extended discussion of aesthetic
versus cognitive expression, see generally BEZANSON, supra note 7, passim.
40. KAROL BERGER, A THEORY OF ART 62 (2000).
41. Id. at 236 (interpreting IMMANUEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 59-60 (James
Creed Meredith trans., Oxford University Press 1952)).
42. YouTube, Willie Horton 1988 Attack Ad,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lo9KMSSEZOY (last visited Apr. 7, 2010); see also Virginia v.
Black, 538 U.S. 343, 354-55 (2003) (discussing the intimidating effect of the Ku Klux Klan's burn-
ing cross).
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such techniques as "tying," efforts "to transform the social meaning of
one act by tying it to, or associating it with, another social meaning that
conforms to the meaning that the architect wishes the managed act to
have. 43
Is the "de-linearization" of speech through aesthetic and emotional
forms of communication like Serrano's "Piss Christ" photograph or Du-
champ's urinal really any different from the mute object of the cross
standing high in the desolation of the Mohave Desert, or the insignia and
name of the Ku Klux Klan on a "Helping Keep our Highways Clean"
sign on the public interstate as it passes through a Black area of town?
These are all instances of speech protected by the First Amendment
when communicated by free-willed individuals. But that does not mean
that they should be immunized from First Amendment challenge if
communicated to the public by the government in its exclusive speech
forum. The government is a speaker that enjoys no individual liberty or
free will, and whose need to express itself is limited by a different consti-
tutional role and duty.44 The government's duty is to facilitate the mar-
ketplace of political expression and the process of self-government
achieved by information and ideas; indeed, to model the form of dialog
and exchange that marks the ideals of a free democratic society. Indi-
viduals may promote political falsehood, or racial hate, or unleash pas-
sion in the service of destruction; the government should not. If it does so
it should be denied a government speech forum protected from First
Amendment challenge.
Can the line between the cognitive and the aesthetic, between the li-
near and the broadly aesthetic, be legally drawn and enforced as a limit
on government speech activity immunized from First Amendment chal-
lenge? My own view is that such a line can be managed. We do so now
in the fields of obscenity,45 evidence,46 intellectual property,47 and politi-
cal campaign speech,48 to name but a few.49 Judges and juries seem to do
a pretty good job even without special training in aesthetics, or art, or
communication theory.
43. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHi. L. REV. 943, 1009 (1995)
(discussed insightfully in Norton, supra note 14, at 42).
44. Bezanson & Buss, supra note 4, at 1508.
45. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
46. Courts regularly judge proposed evidence as prejudicial on very similar criteria.
47. For example, whether a use of copyrighted material is "transformative." 17 U.S.C. § 107
(2006) (outlining the "fair use" of a copyrighted work); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
48. See Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 546 U.S. 410, 411 (2006); R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
49. For a wonderful discussion and analysis of the ambiguities in audience interpretation of
the meaning of speech, see Lidsky, supra note 30, at 805-09. See also Sonia K. Katyal, Semiotic
Disobedience, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 489, 538-41 (2006).
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It is worth noting that Congress has placed similar speech restric-
tions on appropriations resolutions since 1951. The resolutions provide
that "[n]o part of any appropriation contained in this or any other Act
shall be used for publicity or propaganda purposes within the United
States not heretofore authorized by the Congress. '50 Recently, the Office
of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice has interpreted the restric-
tions as "intended to eradicate (i) agency efforts to direct and control
public thinking on various issues of public debate, particularly through
overt political action; (ii) useless, excessive, or frivolous agency publica-
tions; and (iii) agency self-promotion, aggrandizement, or puffery.'
The opinion stated, "The overarching concern [is] the use of federal
funds to manipulate and control public opinion about policy issues," and
"covert attempts to mold opinion through undisclosed use of third par-
ties."52 There is thus reason to conclude that a similar constitutional rule
governing the manner of expression in a broader range of government
speech forums would succeed.
CONCLUSION
Government speech and the government speech forum will not go
away. It is a practical necessity-the more so in our information age.
Many questions about the role and status of government speech remain
to be answered. In the meantime, however, we will be safer and on much
firmer democratic and constitutional ground if we insist that government
speech on public matters to the public must, in the government's own
forum, be transparent, cognitive and reasoned, and limited to those mes-
sages communicated intentionally to a public audience and so understood
by that audience. Anything less, I believe, would unleash a very danger-
ous power in the hands of government, a power, ironically, immunized
from challenge by the First Amendment itself.
50. Consolidated Appropriations Resolution of Feb. 20, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 11,
§ 626, discussed in STEVEN G. BRADBURY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL,
MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES (July 30, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/opfinal.htm [hereinafter DOJ
OLC OPINION].
51. DOJ OLC OPINION, available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/opfinal.htm.
52. Id. (first emphasis added). This longstanding policy has been the subject of numerous
OLC opinions over the course of its fifty-nine year history, and it seems to have been largely hon-
ored in the promise, not the breach. A few judicial opinions reflect this policy as well. See, e.g.,
Nat'l Treasury Employees' Union v. Campbell, 654 F.2d 784, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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